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a r e e  i n t e g r a t e  e  d i  f o r n i r e  u t i l i  i n d i c a z i o n i  d i  i n t e r v e n t o .  P a r t i c o l a r e  a t t e n z i o n e  
è  d e d i c a t a  a l  r u o l o  s v o l t o  d a l l e  i s t i t u z i o n i ,  d a l  p r o g r e s s o  t e c n o l o g i c o  e  d a l l a  
d i f f u s i o n e  d e l l ’ i n n o v a z i o n e  n e l  p r o c e s s o  d i  c o n v e r g e n z a  o  d i v e r g e n z a  t r a  a r e e  
e c o n o m i c h e .  I l  C R E N o S  s i  p r o p o n e  i n o l t r e  d i  s t u d i a r e  l a  c o m p a t i b i l i t à  f r a  t a l i  
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We use national panel data at provincial level to investigate the relationship between 
suicide rates and socio-economic factors in Italy.  The role of family, drug and 
alcohol consumption, social conformism and population density are the main factors 
in explaining the suicide rate in Italy.  In a further step, we check for the differences 
in the suicide determinants between southern and northern provinces.  The findings 
show that the number and size of families as well as alcohol or drug abuse play a key 
role in the northern provinces, while density and social conformism appear to be the 
main factors in the South. 
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1. Introduction  
Although psychiatric illness seems to be the main determinant of  suicide 
(Barraclough et al., 1974; Roy, 1982) and though suicide is considered an 
irrational behaviour by doctors and psychologists, the quest for those 
socio-economic factors which may act as precipitating elements,engaged 
sociologists first and economists later (Preti and Miotto, 1999).   
Durkheim’s theory of  suicide was based on two assumptions 
(Pescosolido and Giorgianna, 1989): individuals are characterized by 
different levels of  social norms, and social integration offers protection 
against suicidal tendencies.  In this vein, social connectors like family and 
religion matter on the suicide rate.   
On the other hand, economist tried to understand the suicide decision 
from an individual point of  view.  Hamermesh and Soss (1974) modelled 
the decision to suicide through a neoclassical approach: a suicide is a 
rational agent that opts to end her life when her discounted lifetime 
utility goes below an established threshold.  From this perspective, 
several economical indicators are believed to have an impact on suicide 
rates and have been studied by economists, including different measures 
of  income and economic wellness (real GDP per capita, growth of  per 
capita income and (un)employment most of  all).   
If  the existing literature tried to bridge the gap between sociological and 
economical explanations (Huang, 2006; Yamamura, 2010), however, the 
empirical results are not necessarily always robust and valid across 
different cultures and countries.   
This paper contributes to the literature by evaluating empirically the 
determinants of  suicide in Italy, looking both at economic and 
sociological aspects, at the province level, from 1996 to 2005.   
Italy is characterized by a culture that is less favourable toward suicide 
than that of  countries with non-christian roots, such as Japan for 
example.  According to Pescosolido-Georgiana (1989), cults and 
especially Catholicism, offer a high level of  integration to individuals facing 
personal crises, all other things being equal.  In this sense we speculate on the 
limited role of  economic factors in a country with strong social capital 
and religious ties.  Italian society, historically family-based and 
conservative, could also generate social tensions and marginalisation that 
might lead to suicidal behaviour. 
Like other Mediterranean countries such as Spain and Greece, Italy 
presents the lowest suicide rates (for an international comparison see 
among others Andrés 2005, Chen et al.  2009, and Noh, 2009).  
Moreover, Italy has experienced a decreasing trend in the suicide ratio 
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between 1996 and 2005, as shown in Figure 1, which illustrates the 
number of  suicides per 100,000 inhabitants.  The overall figures hide 
aninhomogeneous picture among different regions and municipalities in 
Italy.  As shown in Figure 2, the northern part of  Italy presents higher 
levels of  suicide than the Southern part of  the country, suggesting that 
the factors affecting suicide decisions may be different in the two areas.  
Furthermore Figure 2 shows significant differences in suicide rates 
between Italian provinces, even within the same region. 
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows.  Section II describes 
the data and outlines the economic framework.  The results are 
summarized in Section III.  Finally, Section IV concludes. 
 
2. Data description and empirical model 
Following Yamamura (2010), who analyses the relationship between 
suicide rate and socio-economic factors in Japan, the paper proposes the 
following empirical specification: 
 
SUICIDEit = β1 + β2 GROWTHit + β3 INCOMEit +                             
β4 UNEMPLOYMENTit + β5 DIVORCEit +                                  
β6 MARRIAGEit + β7 HOUSEHOLDit +                  
β8 DENSITYit + β9 BIRTHit + β10 ALCOHOLit +      
β11 DRUGit + β12 RELIGIONit +                              
β13 SOCIALFUNDit + uit 
 
where SUICIDEitindicates the number of  suicides per 100 thousands 
inhabitants in the i-th province at year t.  The study employs data from 
103 provinces for the time span between 1996 and 2005.  GROWTH, 
INCOME and UNEMPLOYMENT represent the real economic growth, 
real income per capita and unemployment rate, respectively.  They 
describe the economic condition in the i-th province at time t.  As shown 
by Brainerd (2001) and Neumayer (2003), a negative correlation between 
suicide rate and economic performance is expected.  DIVORCE, 
MARRIAGE and HOUSEHOLD are the number of  divorces, 
marriages and households per 100 thousands residents, respectively.  
Neumayer (2003) and Yamamura (2010) find that higher number and 
size of  families the suicide rate.  DENSITY is the number of  inhabitants 
per squared kilometre, while BIRTH is the number of  births per 100,000 
residents.  ALCOHOL and DRUG indicate the share of  people that 
consume alcohol between meals and the number of  drug dealing 
offences per 100,000 inhabitants; positive signs are expected.   
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RELIGION is the percentage of  religious marriages.  Since religious 
practices are well distributed in the country, it stands for the degree of  
social convention.  In this sense, we expect that the higher the 
percentage of  religious marriages in a given province, the higher the level 
of  social convention and, consequently, of  suicide rate.   
SOCIALFUND indicates the amount of  per capita resources that local 
governments allocate for direct social programs, such as combating 
poverty and social exclusion.  The expected sign is negative.   
In order to explore the structural differences amongst northern and 
southern provinces of  Italy, we run two different models: one for the 
Centre-North of  Italy, and another for the South.   
All data come from National Statistical Office of  Italy (ISTAT), except 
for the economic variables that come from Istituto Tagliacarne.  All 
variables are transformed in logarithm term, so the coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities. 
 
3. Results and discussion 
The results are provided in Table 2.  Columns (1) and (4) show the 
results for the analysis run employing all observations.  The results in 
columns (2)-(5) and (3)-(6) refer to the Centre-North and South models, 
respectively.  The random-effects estimator is selected according to the 
Hausman test statistics.  Furthermore, robust standard errors are 
performed in order to avoid heteroskedasticity problems. 
As shown in table 2, except for UNEMPLOYMENT in column (2)2, the 
economic variables are not significant in all regressions.  These results 
appear not to be driven by multicollinearity problems between the 
economic variables.  As Preti-Miotto (1999) argued, there are still 
concerns in the economic literature regarding the relationship between 
suicide decisions and economic conditions.  As shown by Kunce and 
Anderson (2002), at an aggregate level there is no strong evidence that 
economic factors have a causal relationship with suicide decisions. 
The number of divorces and births are not significant in all 
specifications.  The MARRIAGE coefficient is significant and negative.  
One percent increase in the number of marriages leads to a decrease in 
suicide rate by 0.48%.  Such effect seems to be relevant in the Centre-
North provinces more than the South.  The number of households is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A negative coefficient for unemployment rate is not a novelty in the empirical 
analysis of  suicide (for instance, see Yamamura, 2010).	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proxy of the size of families: the higher the number of households in a 
given province, the lower the average size of the families.  As expected, 
the sign of  the coefficient is positive in all models and equal to 1.89.  
DENSITY is significant and negative in all specifications.  At the 
national level, an increase by 1% in the density of  population reduces the 
suicide rate by 0.15%.  Such result is not surprising because in Italy the 
suicide rate is higher in medium-small sized cities than in big 
municipalities (see Figure 2).  Probably, the social ties and constraints are 
stronger in small communities than in large ones, causing higher levels 
of  suicide. 
The consumption of  drug and alcohol affects the attitude toward suicide 
only in the Centre-North of  Italy.  RELIGION plays a role only in the 
South; where its coefficient is significant and positive.  A rise by 1% in 
the share of  religious marriages increases the suicide rate by 0.22%.   
SOCIALFUND has the expected sign but is not significant in all 
regressions.  Unfortunately, such variable may be endogenous.  In fact, 
high suicide rates could cause higher amounts of  resources to be spent 
in social programs.  Therefore, the SOCIALFUND coefficient could be 
downward biased and inconsistent. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the socioeconomic determinants of  suicide rates 
in Italy. The answers obtained are consistent with the existing literature.  
The number of  households and size of  family negatively affect the 
suicide rate.  Population density shows a negative effect, while drug-
alcohol consumption a positive one.  The religious marriages share, taken 
here as a proxy of  “social conformism”, increases suicide rate.   
Controlling for the structural differences between the North and the 
South of  Italy, we observe that the role of  family, the abuse of  alcohol-
drug consumption and the density of  population are the main 
determinants in the Centre-North provinces where the effects of  
urbanization are more evident, while “social conformism”, measured by 
the share of  religious marriages, and population density are the main 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics 
 Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min Max 
SUICIDES 1,030 7.58 3.61 0.00 23.32 
GROWTH 1,030 0.01 0.03 -0.48 0.12 
INCOME 1,030 15,393.67 4,005.42 7,119.16 26,452.31 
UNEMPLOYMENT 1,030 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.03 
DIVORCE 1,030 129.24 56.37 0.17 441.93 
MARRIAGE 1,030 456.30 65.33 232.20 978.42 
HOUSEHOLD 1,030 39,211.48 3,611.65 31,217.34 50,329.55 
DENSITY 1,030 244.30 330.80 36.54 2,661.62 
BIRTH 1,030 885.37 135.15 565.03 1,412.48 
ALCOL 1,030 0.25 0.07 0.11 0.55 
DRUG 1,030 57.68 45.19 10.30 907.70 
RELIGION 1,030 0.74 0.12 0.41 0.94 






















Table 2.  Regression results on suicide 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All obs. Centre-
North 
South All obs. Centre-
North 
South 
       
GROWTH    0.02 -0.66 0.59 
    (0.32) (0.42) (0.46) 
INCOME 0.06 0.08 -0.18 0.06 0.17 -0.29 
 (0.17) (0.25) (0.31) (0.18) (0.27) (0.33) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.03 -0.10* 0.06 -0.03 -0.10 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.055) (0.06) (0.11) 
DIVORCE 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.00 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
MARRIAGE -0.48*** -0.45** -0.44 -0.48*** -0.44** -0.47 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.39) (0.17) (0.19) (0.39) 
HOUSEHOLD 1.89*** 1.62*** 1.79* 1.89*** 1.57*** 1.78* 
 (0.39) (0.46) (1.04) (0.39) (0.46) (1.06) 
DENSITY -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.23** -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.23** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.044) (0.037) (0.11) 
BIRTH -0.08 -0.14 -0.50 -0.08 -0.19 -0.54 
 (0.16) (0.25) (0.48) (0.16) (0.25) (0.49) 
ALCOHOL 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.15 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.16 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.13) (0.28) 
DRUG 0.05 0.08** 0.02 0.05 0.08** 0.013 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) 
RELIGION 0.22* 0.04 0.32*** 0.22* 0.06 0.32*** 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12) 
SOCIALFUND -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 






 (4.47) (5.69) (11.80) (4.48) (5.69) (11.9) 
       
Observations 1,030 670 360 1,030 670 360 
       
Dummy year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.65 0.24 0.77 0.65 0.25 0.77 
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